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ABSTRACT. The Eastern Greenland case (1931–33) is the only territorial dispute in the polar regions ever to have been decided
by an international court. Norway challenged Denmark’s claim to sovereignty over all of Greenland on the grounds that Denmark
had established effective occupation in a limited area only. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that effective
occupation in the polar regions requires relatively little actual exercise of sovereign rights, and that Denmark therefore did indeed
have sovereignty over the entire island. Both parties in the dispute based many of their arguments on historical evidence, most
notably the records of a series of diplomatic overtures to other states made by Denmark between 1915 and 1921. These documents,
the Norwegians argued, showed that the Danes themselves did not believe that they had sovereignty over the entire island. The
Danes, on the other hand, contended that their sovereignty dated back to the Middle Ages. The Court found the Danish arguments
more convincing. However, the dissenting opinion of Justice Dionisio Anzilotti upheld the Norwegian interpretation. This paper
re-examines the issue in the light of historical evidence, found recently in Canadian archives, that was not available to the Court.
These new documents indicate that Anzilotti’s view was the correct one. While the 1933 decision in favour of Denmark can be
upheld on other than historical grounds, a re-assessment of the historical evidence and arguments presented to the PCIJ is essential
to set the record straight.
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RÉSUMÉ. Le cas du Groenland oriental (1931-1933) constitue le seul conflit territorial des régions polaires à n’avoir jamais été
tranché par un tribunal international. La Norvège avait contesté la revendication de souveraineté du Danemark sur tout le
Groenland, sous prétexte que le Danemark n’avait effectivement occupé qu’une partie limitée de ce territoire. La Cour permanente
de justice internationale (CPJI) a soutenu qu’une occupation effective des régions polaires ne nécessite qu’un exercice réel
relativement faible des droits de souveraineté, et que par conséquent, le Danemark avait effectivement le droit de souveraineté
sur toute l’île. Les deux parties visées par le conflit fondaient grand nombre de leurs arguments sur des preuves historiques, plus
précisément les dossiers d’une série d’ouvertures diplomatiques faites par le Danemark à d’autres États entre 1915 et 1921. Les
Norvégiens soutenaient que ces documents prouvaient que les Danois mêmes ne croyaient pas avoir la souveraineté sur toute l’île.
Pour leur part, les Danois affirmaient que leur souveraineté remontait au Moyen-Âge. La Cour avait trouvé les arguments des
Danois plus probants. Toutefois, l’avis minoritaire du juge Dionisio Anzilotti venait appuyer l’interprétation des Norvégiens. Ce
document examine cet enjeu de nouveau à la lumière de preuves historiques trouvées récemment dans les archives canadiennes,
preuves qui n’étaient pas à la disposition de la Cour à ce moment-là. Ces nouveaux documents laissent croire que le point de vue
du juge Anzilotti était exact. Bien que la décision de 1933 en faveur du Danemark puisse être maintenue en raison de motifs autres
qu’historiques, la réévaluation des preuves historiques et des arguments présentés à la CPJI s’impose afin de tirer les choses au
clair.
Mots clés : souveraineté, Groenland oriental, régions polaires
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INTRODUCTION
The decision in the case of the Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland, handed down by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) in 1933, is frequently cited as an
assertion of the principle that effective occupation in the
polar regions requires relatively little actual exercise of
sovereign rights (for example, see Shaw, 2003:437). The
case was a ground-breaking one (Anon., 1933:151; von der
Heydte, 1935:464). Since the 18th century, it has been a
received principle in international law that settlement and
extensive administrative acts by a state are required to
establish its sovereignty over new lands. However, the PCIJ
held that Denmark had sovereignty over all of Greenland
even though Danish settlement and administration were
confined to the southwestern coast of the island. The exact-
ing requirements of international law were thus altered “to
permit a flexible standard which depends upon the circum-
stances of the territory. The more isolated the territory
and the fewer the inhabitants, the less stringent are the
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requirements of effective occupation” (Triggs, 1986:30; see
also Waldock, 1948; Rothwell, 1996). Indeed, it has even
been said that “the doctrine of effective occupation barely
exists in remote and sparsely occupied territories” like the
Arctic and Antarctic (Triggs, 1986:31 – 32).
In the words of legal scholar Oscar Svarlien (1964:72),
the Eastern Greenland case is still “of paramount impor-
tance as regards territorial claims in polar regions. It is the
only case involving a territorial question in the Arctic to be
decided by an international tribunal which...had the op-
portunity to lay down the relevant rules of law.” Moreover,
the principle enunciated by the PCIJ in this case has been
applied to territorial disputes outside the polar regions. In
recent cases decided by the International Court of Justice
and at least one arbitral tribunal, the rule that occupation
of remote, inhospitable, and thinly populated land may be
effected by relatively little state activity has proved cru-
cial, and in every instance it has been backed up by
reference to a single case: Eastern Greenland (see Eritrea/
Yemen Case, 1999:118; ICJ, 2001:100, 2002:682).
Behind this apparently straightforward legal principle
lies a historical chain of events which was anything but
simple or easy to understand. The contention of this article
is that the PCIJ chose to ignore many of the historical
complexities of the case in order to render a decision that
appeared just and equitable on other than historical grounds.
Without questioning the validity of these other grounds, it
is useful to re-examine the development of the dispute
between Denmark and Norway and the historical argu-
ments put forward by the two countries, and to consider the
case in the light of historical evidence that was not avail-
able to the Court.
Between 1721 and 1921, Denmark established and
administered colonies on the southwestern coast of Green-
land. An outpost on the eastern coast was added in 1894,
but vast areas in the eastern and northern parts of the island
were outside Danish rule. Foreigners were barred from
even entering the colonies except at certain ports or in
cases of shipwreck, and after 1774, the state-owned Royal
Greenland Company monopolized all trade in the colo-
nized areas. In the north and the east, however, British,
American, and Norwegian explorers, hunters, and whalers
roamed freely from the middle of the 19th century on, and
the British whalers and American explorers occasionally
engaged in trade with the Inughuit of Thule in the north-
western part of the island. The Danish government made
no attempt to regulate their activities (Vaughan, 1991;
Svarlien, 1964).
Between 1915 and 1921, Denmark made a series of
diplomatic overtures to other nations, with the aim of
obtaining their consent to the extension of Danish author-
ity over the entire island. The initial impetus for this series
of events came from the United States. In October 1915,
the American secretary of state, Robert Lansing, informed
the Danish minister in Washington that his country wished
to purchase the Danish West Indies. The purchase was a
high priority for the Americans, who feared a German
invasion of Denmark and subsequent German use of the
Danish islands as a naval base. In December 1915, the
Danes put forward the suggestion that, in addition to
making a cash payment for the islands, the Americans
should declare that they would not contest the extension of
Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland (U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 1940:501 – 511; Tansill, 1966). The agree-
ment, signed on 4 August 1916, included the statement that
the government of the United States would “not object to
the Danish Government extending their political and eco-
nomic interests to the whole of Greenland” (U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 1971:62).
After the end of the First World War, Denmark raised
the Greenland issue with the other powers. On 14 July
1919, the Danish minister in Oslo informed the Norwegian
government of Denmark’s plans; in response, Norwegian
foreign minister Nils Ihlen stated on 22 July that his
government “ne ferait pas de difficultés au règlement de
cette affaire” (PCIJ, 1933d:2553). Diplomatic notes were
addressed to Great Britain (16 March 1920), Italy (17
March 1920), France (20 March 1920), and Japan (12 May
1920). The French, Italians, and Japanese all made favour-
able replies in March – June 1920. The British, however,
demurred. In a note dated 20 July 1920, the Danes insisted
that their sovereignty over the entire island was of long
standing, dating back to the settlement founded by Hans
Egede in 1721. On 6 September 1920, the British acknowl-
edged Danish sovereignty, but they reserved the right to be
consulted should the Danes ever decide to sell the island
(PCIJ, 1933c:1824 – 1832; 1933b:45 – 48).
In January 1921, the Danish government asked the
Norwegians for a written confirmation of Ihlen’s verbal
promise. When there was no reply, the Danes repeated the
request on 29 April 1921. Again, there was no reply. On 10
May 1921, Denmark formally declared its sovereignty
over all of Greenland, at the same time extending the Royal
Greenland Company’s trade monopoly. The Norwegians
promptly registered their dissent. Eastern Greenland, they
insisted, remained a terra nullius or no man’s land, where
they were free to operate as they wished. A Danish note
dated 19 December 1921 informed the Norwegians that
Denmark’s sovereignty over all of Greenland was of long
standing (PCIJ, 1933c:1580 – 1592). A compromise agree-
ment whereby Norwegian hunters and whalers could con-
tinue their economic activities on the eastern coast
ultimately failed. In June 1931, a group of Norwegians
raised their national flag at Mackenzie Bay, and on 10 July,
a royal proclamation formally claimed the eastern coast
between 71˚30' N and 75˚40' N, giving it the name Eirik
Raudes Land. Denmark immediately took the case to the
PCIJ (Svarlien, 1964).
The Court held in its decision of 5 April 1933 that
Denmark had long since established sovereignty over the
entire island, not merely the colonies, and that Norway was
estopped from laying claim to any part of Greenland by its
acceptance of the Treaty of Kiel (1814), by a number of
commercial treaties that named Greenland as a Danish
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possession, and by the Ihlen declaration (as it became
known). Norway’s contention that Ihlen did not have the
authority to give such an undertaking without the consent of
the Norwegian storting (parliament) was rejected. The Court
also rejected Norway’s argument that “the attitude which
Denmark adopted between 1915 and 1921, when she ad-
dressed herself to various Powers in order to obtain a
recognition of her position in Greenland, was inconsistent
with a claim to be already in possession of the sovereignty
over all Greenland, and that in the circumstances she is now
estopped from alleging a long established sovereignty over
the whole country” (PCIJ, 1933c:45). The Norwegian occu-
pation was therefore deemed unlawful.
In many ways, the decision in Denmark’s favour was
unquestionably the right one: between 1915 and 1921,
Denmark had shown the intention to act as sovereign over
the entire island, and several nations, including Great
Britain and the United States, had given their consent to
the extension of Danish rule, as had Norway with the Ihlen
declaration. Between 1921 and 1931, the Danes substan-
tially increased their activities in the east and the north. By
the critical date of 1931, therefore, Denmark’s sovereignty
over all of Greenland had been established, even though its
administration had not yet been extended to every part of
the island (see the decision in the Clipperton Island Case,
1932).
However, a careful examination of the record shows
that the historical evidence submitted by Denmark was far
from sufficient to prove that its sovereignty over the
uncolonized areas long predated the dispute with Norway.
The Court’s use of the historical data available to it was
often questionable and always highly unsystematic. In
contrast, the painstaking analysis of the historical record
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Dionisio Anzilotti is a
model of lucid thinking (on Anzilotti, see Ruda, 1992).
Anzilotti agreed that Norway was bound by the Ihlen
declaration. However, he was not convinced that Danish
actions before 1921 were sufficient evidence of an inten-
tion to act as sovereign. Instead, he concluded that Den-
mark’s diplomatic overtures to other nations in the early
20th century were undertaken precisely because the Danes
themselves did not then believe that they had sovereignty
over the entire island. Justices Schücking and Wang,
though they concurred in the Court’s decision, agreed with
Anzilotti that between 1915 and 1921, “Denmark herself
did not maintain towards the other interested Powers the
theory of an already existing Danish sovereignty over the
whole country” (PCIJ, 1933a:96).
Evidence that was not available in 1931 – 33, but which
has recently come to light among the papers of Canadian
geographer and Arctic expert Trevor Lloyd, demonstrates
conclusively that, as Anzilotti, Schücking, and Wang real-
ized, the Danish government did not believe that it had title
to the entire island prior to 1921. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, Lloyd made an extensive collection of Danish
documents, now held by the Trent University Archives,
about the history of northern Greenland. A 1925 letter
from Knud Rasmussen to O.D. Skelton at Library and
Archives Canada provides important additional evidence.
These documents show that by 1910, when Rasmussen
founded his trading station at Thule, the Danes wished to
extend their rule over all of Greenland. However, they
feared opposition from the Americans or the British, since
both of these nations could have put forward a claim to
northern Greenland. Danish diplomatic manoeuvres there-
fore contained a strong element of bluff. The same tactics
that had produced the acquiescence of the British in 1920
were successfully employed against the Norwegians in
1931 – 33.
This article compares the Court’s use of the available
historical evidence on Eastern Greenland with Anzilotti’s
exemplary analysis of the same facts, and it will demon-
strate the validity of Anzilotti’s reasoning by reference to
the previously unpublished historical documents on the
history of the Thule station. Correct though the broad
conclusions drawn by the Court may have been, Anzilotti’s
arguments are still of great interest and value, illustrating
as they do a high level of rigour and sophistication in the
evaluation of historical data.
THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS
PRESENTED TO THE COURT
Rather ironically, the Greenland colonies came to Den-
mark by way of Norway. The two original colonies,
Estribygd (the East Settlement) and Vestribygd (the West
Settlement), were founded by Eirik Raude in the 10th
century, and at first were independent. They became for-
mally subject to Norway in 1261. Sturla Thórdarson’s
Hákonarsaga provides the only surviving account of the
agreement between the Norwegian king and the colonists.
The saga relates that the king sent emissaries to Greenland;
on their return, the emissaries reported that the settlers
were willing to pay tribute to Norway, and that they would
also pay fines for all killings of either settlers or native
Greenlanders, whether these took place in the settlements
or on journeys to the north, “right up to the Pole Star”
(Gad, 1971:120). The West Settlement died out in the 14th
century, possibly as a result of conflicts with the native
Greenlanders (Gad, 1971). In 1380, Norway and Denmark
were united under one crown, and by the early 16th
century, Norway had been reduced to the status of a Danish
province. Contact between Denmark-Norway and the East
Settlement was lost early in the 15th century because of
worsening climatic conditions and heavy ice along the
coast. This settlement too died out sometime in the next
century and a half (Gad, 1971). Until the early 19th
century, all attempts to approach the eastern coast of
Greenland were thwarted by ice.
Scandinavian settlement on Greenland was revived by
the Norwegian missionary Hans Egede in 1721. With the
permission of the Danish government, Egede founded a
trading station and Lutheran mission at Godthåb (present-
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day Nuuk). Subsequently, Danish-Norwegian trade was
carried out by several different companies, each in turn
granted a monopoly by the government. These companies
had difficulty in making a profit because of intense com-
petition from Dutch traders. In response, the Danish gov-
ernment issued a series of proclamations banning foreign
trading in or near the Danish settlements. Despite the
occasional use of naval vessels and armed merchantmen to
protect Danish interests from 1736 onward, the Dutch
continued their activities. In response, the number of
Danish colonies was steadily increased, and by the 1770s,
the area of colonization extended as far north as Upernavik.
In 1774, the Danish government granted the monopoly of
trade to the state-owned Royal Greenland Company, and
in 1776, the most detailed in the series of royal proclama-
tions was issued, declaring the coast of Greenland from
Julianehåb to Upernavik closed to foreigners (and also to
the majority of Danes) (Gad, 1973). The various 18th-
century proclamations and ordinances asserted the rights
of the kings of Denmark-Norway as “Souverains Sei-
gneurs et héréditaires du Groenland et des îles en depend-
ant” (PCIJ, 1933c:1534). The settled areas were referred to
as “les Colonies par Nous établies dans Notre pays de
Groenland” (PCIJ, 1933c:1531). Among these decrees
was one that included an injunction against harming the
native Greenlanders, even outside the colonies (PCIJ,
1933c:1533).
By the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, Norway was separated from
Denmark and placed under the crown of Sweden. Denmark
retained the Greenland colonies, along with Iceland and
the Faroe Islands. The Norwegians, indignant both at
being placed under Swedish rule without their consent and
at the loss of their ancient colonies, initially rejected the
treaty, but they were compelled to accept it in the Stock-
holm Convention of 1 September 1819 (Svarlien, 1964).
The dominance of Denmark over Norway in the period
between 1380 and 1814 and the circumstances under
which the Danes retained the former Norwegian posses-
sions produced considerable animosity between the two
countries, which lasted well into the 20th century. Per-
haps because of this long-standing resentment, the Nor-
wegians focused too intensely on historical grievances
from the distant past when they brought their case before
the Court (Berlin, 1932:25–36). The Norwegians made a
number of accusations against the Danes: that they were
responsible for the loss of contact with the East Settle-
ment in the 15th century (thereby losing any rights de-
rived from Norway’s sovereignty over Greenland); that
they had deliberately resorted to trickery during the
negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Kiel; and that
they had acted illegally in separating the Norwegian
colonies from Norway (Svarlien, 1964:14–15). Accord-
ing to the Norwegians, Denmark-Norway had lost its
former claims when the East Settlement was abandoned.
Therefore, in the 18th century the Danish-Norwegian
crown had sovereignty only over the colonized areas. The
rest of the island was, and remained, a terra nullius.
Though the ordinances spoke of “Greenland” as a Danish
possession, the term referred only to the colonies. Den-
mark retained this limited sovereignty through duplici-
tous means, and Norway did not consent to the transfer of
the colonies to exclusive Danish ownership. The Norwe-
gians insisted that because their storting had not ratified
the Treaty of Kiel, its provisions were not binding on
them (see Bull, 1929; Smedal, 1931; Skeie, 1932).
The Danes, in turn, argued that the old Norwegian
monarchy had sovereignty over all of Greenland; that
these rights were retained by the Danish-Norwegian crown
after the union of 1380 and throughout the period when
there was no contact with the East Settlement, to be
asserted once again in the 18th century; and that full
sovereignty over the entire island was lawfully retained by
Denmark in 1814 (see Rasmussen, 1927, 1931; Berlin,
1932; Federspiel, 1932). The Danes were able to demolish
many of the Norwegian claims. It was relatively easy to
prove that the abandonment of the East Settlement oc-
curred by force of circumstances, not intention; that Dan-
ish actions in 1814 were lawful; and that, however
reluctantly the Norwegians had accepted the Treaty of
Kiel, they had indeed accepted it. However, even if Den-
mark had lawfully retained the colonies, all the Danish
arguments based on history were invalid if the Danes
themselves did not believe before 1921 that they had
sovereignty over the uncolonized areas. It was perhaps
Norway’s greatest mistake not to have focused more
strongly on the years between 1915 and 1921. In choosing
instead to air their many historical grievances on the
subject of their lost colonies, the Norwegians at times
appeared overly emotional and vindictive.
THE COURT’S DECISION
The Court began by observing that because the critical
date was 10 July 1931, it was not “necessary that sover-
eignty over Greenland should have existed throughout the
period during which the Danish Government maintains
that it was in being.” Nevertheless, it went on to fully
uphold all of Denmark’s historical claims. The Court
concluded that in the 13th and 14th centuries, because
fines were to be paid to the King of Norway for killings that
took place outside the colonies, “[s]o far as it is possible to
apply modern terminology” to the situation, Norwegian
rights “amounted to sovereignty” and “were not limited”
to the settlements. During the period between the loss of
contact with the colonists and the resettlement of 1721, the
claims of the Danish-Norwegian monarchy “amounted
merely to pretensions,” but in the absence of any claims by
other nations, even pretensions carried some weight (PCIJ,
1933a:45 – 48).
As noted above, 18th-century Danish ordinances spoke
of “Greenland” as a Danish possession. In the Court’s
opinion, the burden of proof was on Norway to demon-
strate that the word should not be considered as meaning
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the entire island, and Norway had not presented sufficient
evidence to establish this. In addition, one decree had
forbidden violence outside the colonized areas. Therefore,
“bearing in mind the absence of any claim to sovereignty
by another Power, and the Arctic and inaccessible charac-
ter of the uncolonized parts of the country, the King of
Denmark and Norway displayed during the period from
the founding of the colonies by Hans Egede in 1721 up to
1814 his authority to an extent sufficient to give his
country a valid claim to the sovereignty, and ... his rights
over Greenland were not limited to the colonized area.”
Norway’s acceptance of the Treaty of Kiel in 1819 must be
regarded as an undertaking “not to dispute Danish sover-
eignty over Greenland.” While the Ihlen declaration could
not be interpreted as an acknowledgement of a pre-exist-
ing Danish sovereignty, it was “beyond all dispute” a
binding promise not to contest or place difficulties in the
way of Danish claims (PCIJ, 1933a:49 – 51, 64, 71).
As for the Danish diplomatic correspondence with other
nations during the years 1915 – 21, it was certainly true
that the expression “extension of sovereignty” was used,
and that this expression, “if taken by itself,” would be
“very difficult to reconcile” with Danish claims to long-
standing sovereignty over the entire island. However, the
Court had decided that “too much importance must not be
attached to particular expressions here and there.” The
different expressions used in the various notes were un-
doubtedly the result of the fact that they were not all
drafted by the same individual. The Court was satisfied
that the aim of the Danish government throughout the
period in question was “to secure…an assurance from each
of the foreign governments concerned that it accepted the
Danish point of view that all Greenland was already
subject to Danish sovereignty and was therefore content to
see an extension of Denmark’s activities to the uncolonized
parts of Greenland.” The Court conceded that “well-quali-
fied private persons” in Denmark had expressed the opin-
ion that in the absence of effective occupation on the east
coast, the area remained a terra nullius. However, there
was no evidence to show that the Danish government itself
had ever held this view. According to the Court, the
government made its overtures in order to have foreign
states acknowledge Denmark’s already existing sover-
eignty, so that any doubts there might be on this subject at
home or abroad would be removed (PCIJ, 1933a:54 – 56).
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that even if the
period from 1921 to 1931 was judged “by itself and
without reference to the preceding periods,” Denmark’s
actions in those years must be considered “sufficient to
constitute a valid claim to sovereignty.” When the histori-
cal background was taken into consideration, the finding
in Denmark’s favour was “confirmed and strengthened”
(PCIJ, 1933a:63 – 64).
ANZILOTTI’S OPINION
Anzilotti opened with an expression of his fundamental
disagreement with the way the Court had approached the
case. In his mind, the key issue was the Ihlen declaration,
and the Danish request to Norway in 1919 was “only one
of several similar overtures on the part of the Danish
Government addressed, from the end of 1915 onwards, to
a number of States with a view to defining and securing its
position in Greenland.” Therefore, it was not possible
“rightly to appreciate the request with which we are con-
cerned unless we consider it in conjunction with the whole
series of overtures of which it formed part” (PCIJ,
1933a:76 – 77).
The focal point of Anzilotti’s analysis was therefore the
diplomatic correspondence from the period 1915 – 21. He
noted that the Danes “had every interest in presenting the
request addressed to the Norwegian Government, and
other similar overtures, in the light of a preconceived
theory” (PCIJ, 1933a:76). Unlike his colleagues, who
dismissed the expression “extension of sovereignty” as
not characteristic of the correspondence as a whole,
Anzilotti preferred to study the documents in chronologi-
cal order, carefully noting variations in wording, and
considering the possible reasons for any changes. In his
view, the language used in the various replies was crucial,
indicating as it did how the governments addressed under-
stood the Danish request.
Anzilotti pointed out that the Danish request to the
United States in December 1915 was of particular impor-
tance because it was the first in the series, and because “in
all the overtures successively undertaken by it, the Danish
Government expressly referred to the request made to the
United States of America; the American declaration was
submitted to the other governments as a model for the
declaration asked of them” (PCIJ, 1933a:78). The Danes
had clearly asked the Americans for an undertaking not to
contest the extension of their sovereignty. Internal Danish
documents from 1915 and 1916 also spoke of an extension,
not a recognition, of sovereignty. It was therefore evident
to Anzilotti that at this point, the Danes had not either
believed or claimed that their sovereignty over the entire
island pre-dated the correspondence. Nor could the Ameri-
can statement of 1916 be interpreted in any other way than
as an agreement not to dispute the extension of Danish
sovereignty.
Denmark’s request to Norway in July 1919 and its notes
to Britain, France, Italy, and Japan in March–May 1920
were all couched in similar terms. The Danes spoke of a pre-
existing sovereignty only to the British, and only in July
1920—that is, after the British had proved reluctant to give
the undertaking requested by Denmark. Accordingly, the
French and Japanese replies agreed to an extension of
sovereignty, while the Italian note stated that “the Royal
Government will have no difficulty in recognizing the
sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland.” In other words,
the Italians were willing to acknowledge Danish sovereignty
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at some point in the future, after it had been established. The
British note of 6 September 1920, in contrast, seemed to
recognize a pre-existing sovereignty, although the fact that
the British reserved the right to be consulted in the event that
the Danes ever sold Greenland raised some doubt as to
whether this was in fact their intention (PCIJ, 1933a:81).
When the Norwegians protested against the Danish
proclamation of 10 May 1921, they too were told (in
December 1921) that Danish sovereignty was of long
standing, and so did not now require recognition from
other states. As Anzilotti shrewdly observed, “the Danish
Government affirmed the pre-existence of its sovereignty
over all Greenland when it was necessary to do this in
order to refute claims which it was unable or unwilling to
admit; apart from such cases, it confined itself to asking
for a recognition of an extension of its sovereignty.” The
notes addressed to Great Britain in July 1920 and to
Norway in December 1921 could not, then, be considered
as representing the Danish government’s true position;
rather, they were part of a carefully calculated bluff.
“[T]he only conclusion which I find it possible to derive,”
Anzilotti wrote, “is that…the Danish Government was
perfectly aware of the possibility of adopting either atti-
tude: viz. that of affirming an already existing sovereignty,
and requesting its recognition, or that of urging reasons in
support of an extension of its sovereignty, and requesting
the recognition of this extension. It elected to adopt the
latter attitude and resorted to the former in the course of a
discussion and to avoid conditions or limitations which it
felt unable to accept” (PCIJ, 1933a:80 – 81; for a similar
conclusion, see Preuss, 1932:474).
As for the other historical evidence put forward by
Denmark, in Anzilotti’s opinion the payment of tribute and
fines to the Norwegian king by the Greenland colonists
was an acknowledgement of Norway’s suzerainty, not its
sovereignty in the modern sense. With regard to the 18th
century, he noted the vast “disproportion between the
claim to sovereignty over all Greenland and the effective
exercise of that sovereignty.” Anzilotti considered it an
“essential point” that there was “a profound difference
between the colonized regions of Greenland and the re-
mainder thereof; for, whereas in the colonies there was a
regular administration and a judicial organization, in the
remainder of Greenland there were perhaps laws in force
but no authority to enforce them: in fact—and this is a
circumstance as exceptional as it is significant—no offi-
cials had even been appointed competent to decide dis-
putes or to apply and ensure respect for the law.” The
requirements of international law might have been satis-
fied by this situation in earlier ages, but by the 18th century
those requirements had changed, and Danish practices had
not changed along with them. In the 18th and 19th centu-
ries, grandiose but insubstantial territorial claims made by
other nations had been either abandoned or made effective.
Claims based on the old Norwegian rights were no longer
relevant by 1721. At the time of the Danish re-colonization,
Greenland was a terra nullius, and sovereignty over it had
to be gained “in accordance with the rules governing
occupation” (PCIJ, 1933a:83 – 84).
Anzilotti could easily understand why the Danish gov-
ernment felt anxiety about the parts of Greenland that had
not been effectively occupied. It was certainly not in the
government’s interest to make any public acknowledge-
ment of its concerns, and Anzilotti felt that no significance
should be attached to the fact that it had not done so. That
serious doubts had existed in Copenhagen was “proved by
the very overtures which [Denmark] made. A proceeding
of this kind is explicable only when the government which
resorts to it thinks it necessary to safeguard a doubtful or
unsettled position.” As Anzilotti pointed out, action of this
type had “not been often resorted to.” That the Danes
should ask other countries to consent to an extension of
their sovereignty was “the clear and natural outcome” of
the “historical development of Denmark’s position in
Greenland.” Anzilotti concluded that, while the Ihlen
declaration was indeed binding on Norway, and the Nor-
wegian occupation was therefore unlawful, “[because]
Denmark admitted to Norway in 1919 that there were parts
of Greenland which were not yet subject to her sover-
eignty, she could not now adduce a sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland, existing prior to that date” (PCIJ,
1933a:84 – 86, 94).
NEW EVIDENCE
An important question not asked by Anzilotti was why
the Danes chose to request the agreement of other powers to
the extension of their sovereignty rather than simply to go
ahead with effective occupation. Indeed, it may have seemed
to the other members of the Court that for Denmark to
request the recognition of an already existing sovereignty
over all of Greenland from other states was a reasonable
way of proceeding, while there would have been less point
in asking foreign governments to agree to a proposed exten-
sion of Danish sovereignty. If the Danes did not believe that
their sovereignty extended beyond the colonies, but wished
to bring the entire island under their rule, why not establish
occupation, and then present the other powers with a fait
accompli? There had been no other claims to Greenland in
all the centuries since its discovery, so why should the
Danes fear opposition? The government of Canada, which
found itself in a similar situation with regard to Arctic
sovereignty in the early 20th century, made no approaches
to other countries before dispatching A.P. Low and Joseph
Bernier on their northern voyages in 1903 and 1906, or
before establishing Royal Canadian Mounted Police posts
on several Arctic islands during the 1920s.
The answer to this question lies in the history of north-
ern, not eastern, Greenland. Here the Danes might well
anticipate claims from two of the great powers, Britain and
the United States. In the United States, Arctic explorer
Robert Peary was a vocal and potentially very influential
advocate of an American territorial claim.
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Danish expeditions were sent to the eastern coast of the
island in 1829 – 30, 1883 – 85, 1891 – 92, 1898 – 1900, and
1906 – 08, but before 1902, no Dane had even visited north-
ern Greenland except as a member of a British or American
expedition. British explorers John Ross (1818) and Edward
Augustus Inglefield (1852) made the important early dis-
coveries in the North. They were followed by Americans
Elisha Kent Kane, Charles Francis Hall, Adolphus Greely,
Robert Peary, and Donald MacMillan, and by another Brit-
ish expedition under Sir George Nares. Hall, as the leader of
an officially sponsored expedition, raised the American flag
and claimed the territory he had discovered for the United
States on 5 September 1871 (Davis, 1876:104). From the
1880s until the beginning of the First World War, Scottish
whalers regularly visited the Inughuit settlements on the
Greenland side of Smith Sound. The first Danish expedition
to northwestern Greenland was Ludvig Mylius-Erichsen’s
Danish Literary Expedition (1902 – 04). The Literary Expe-
dition was privately sponsored, and its main objective was
ethnographic work among the Inughuit. However, both
Mylius-Erichsen and his companion Knud Rasmussen had
definite political aims as well. They were anxious to secure
northern Greenland for Denmark, and they hoped that their
expedition would be the precursor of permanent Danish
settlement (Vaughan, 1991; see also Lindow, 1929). In the
early years of the 20th century, however, the region was
almost the exclusive private preserve of the American,
Peary. Peary wintered in the Smith Sound area in 1891 – 92,
1893 – 95, and 1898 – 1902. His first objective was the
exploration of northern Greenland, which he completed in
1900. From 1900 to 1909, Peary’s goal was the attainment
of the North Pole.
A man driven by relentless ambition, Peary reacted with
intense hostility and competitiveness to intruders in “his”
world. When Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup appeared
in Smith Sound in 1898, Peary refused all friendly over-
tures from his rival, and set out in the dead of winter to
establish a more northerly base. In the face of such steely
determination, combined with unfavourable ice condi-
tions in the area, Sverdrup abandoned his plans to take his
ship up Nares Strait and to explore the northeastern coast
of Greenland. Instead, he turned his course away from
Peary’s domain and explored to the west of Ellesmere
Island (see Herbert, 1989). The presence of a rival, then,
merely spurred Peary on to greater efforts. Peary had a
firm economic and emotional hold over the Inughuit,
whom he employed as hunters and dog drivers. During the
periods when he was in the United States, they eagerly
awaited his return, since they needed fresh supplies of
necessities like ammunition and luxuries like biscuits.
Even when they resented his commanding ways, it was
hard for the Inughuit to deny his requests. “People were
afraid of him…really afraid…You always had the feeling
that if you didn’t do what he wanted, he would condemn
you to death,” one Inughuk recalled decades later (Malaurie,
1982:121, 234). So long as Peary was a regular visitor to
northern Greenland, there was no hope of establishing
even an unofficial Danish presence there. Danish geogra-
pher H.P. Steensby (1909:892) sourly described him as the
“uncrowned monarch, who considers himself the legiti-
mate owner of all countries and inhabitants from Cape
York and northwards.” Perhaps significantly, the Danish
Literary Expedition did its work during one of the intervals
when Peary was not in the North.
In 1909, however, Peary at last reached the North Pole
(or claimed to have done so), and he left the Arctic for
good. At the same time, Rasmussen discovered that
Sverdrup had plans to return to Smith Sound now that
Peary had gone, and to establish a trading station there. He
also heard rumours of German plans to trade with the
Inughuit. Rasmussen therefore strongly urged the Danish
government to take action. In March 1910, his proposal for
a Danish station was discussed by a committee including
officials from the Ministry of the Interior and from the
Royal Greenland Company (Nyeboe, 1935). As Rasmussen
himself recorded, he “received an answer to the effect that
the land being considered No Man’s Land, the Danish
Government…did not see its way to establish a station
there” for fear of provoking explicit American or British
claims. Any Danish actions “would therefore have to be
left to a private initiative” (Rasmussen, 1925). It was
hinted to Rasmussen that though “foreign policy consid-
erations prevented the government from proceeding…there
might later be a possibility of a takeover, once everything
had been put in place by private means” (Rasmussen,
1926; see also Sand, 1934; Gilberg, 1988:47). In other
words, Rasmussen was to establish a Danish presence
while leaving the government free to disavow any respon-
sibility for his actions should Peary persuade the American
government to protest.
Rasmussen accordingly acted on his own, hoping that
the existence of a private Danish trading post would at
least forestall claims by other governments. His task was
made much harder by the fact that the cautious govern-
ment, determined to avoid any difficulties with the Ameri-
cans and British, flatly refused to provide a declaration
that it had nothing against the plan. Without such a decla-
ration, potential backers were wary. Rasmussen neverthe-
less finally obtained sufficient funds with the help of his
friend, engineer Ib Nyeboe (Nyeboe, 1935). Accompanied
by another young Dane with a taste for northern adventure,
Peter Freuchen, Rasmussen returned to Greenland in the
summer of 1910. The two men were determined “to fi-
nance our own [expeditions] by trading with the natives,
furnishing them with goods, making a living for ourselves,
and at the same time making the northern, as well as the
southern, part of Greenland Danish territory” (Freuchen,
1935:35, 45). From their station, which they named Thule,
Rasmussen and Freuchen carried out important explora-
tions of the northern coastline and interior in 1912 and
1916 – 18.
The documents on the history of Thule, then, record
explicit statements by Danish government officials that
they considered northern Greenland a no man’s land. (Of
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course, these documents are only indirect records of the
government’s position, but given the strong patriotic feel-
ings of Rasmussen and his associates, there is no reason to
doubt the accuracy of their evidence.) The accounts writ-
ten by Rasmussen and Nyeboe show that a cautious atti-
tude prevailed in Copenhagen: officials there were
determined not to risk any confrontation with the United
States or Britain. As it turned out, the 1915 – 16 approach
to the United States was successful despite Peary’s strong
opposition (see Anon., 1916a, b; Stafford, 1974; Stefansson,
1974a, b). Great Britain, in turn, proved to have no wish to
press its claims beyond asserting a right to be consulted
should the Danes ever sell Greenland. Denmark therefore
had little to lose—and much to gain—by claiming to
Norway in 1921 and to the Court in 1931 – 33 that Danish
sovereignty over all of Greenland was of long standing.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision to ignore the references to an
extension of sovereignty in the diplomatic correspondence
is, in itself, difficult to justify, especially in the light of the
new historical evidence cited above. However, a narrowly
historical focus would exclude many other relevant con-
siderations. Undoubtedly, the Court upheld the Danish
case because of Denmark’s strong position at the critical
date of 10 July 1931, and because the Ihlen declaration, as
Anzilotti agreed, was a major stumbling block for the
Norwegians. Moreover, a finding in favour of Norway
would have opened up the possibility of disruptive claims
and counter-claims about other sparsely populated territo-
ries in a world already containing more than enough
potential for international conflict.
It would be highly unreasonable for international law to
apply the criteria for effective occupation as stringently in
the polar regions as it does in the temperate zones (see von
der Heydte, 1935:462 – 471; McKitterick, 1939:93 – 94).
When taken in a broad context, the Court’s decision was
the right one. Nevertheless, the historical evidence should
now be evaluated more critically than the Court chose to
do at the time. Anzilotti’s careful, systematic study of the
facts at his disposal deserves the attention of legal schol-
ars. And, in terms of the historical record, too easy an
acceptance of the idea that the Court’s decision was founded
on a carefully balanced appreciation of all the relevant
facts would be a serious error.
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